The Peace Dividend of Distance: Violence as Interaction Across Space by Rohner, Dominic et al.
The Peace Dividend of Distance: Violence as Interaction Across
Space∗
Hannes Mueller†, Dominic Rohner‡, David Schönholzer§
February 8, 2019
Abstract
More distant targets are harder to attack, and hence increased distance between potential
attackers and targets may reduce fatalities. To study this, we model violence as interaction
across space, using a game-theoretic model. To estimate the structural parameters of the
model, we use fine-grained data from Northern Ireland on local religious composition, and on
the identity of attackers and victims in violent events in 1969-1989. Quantifying the effect of
distance adds dramatically to our understanding of where violence arises in a conflict. Our
model also predicts the trajectory of attacks, the construction of so-called “peacewalls”and
suggests that changing distances due to population movements can account for a large part
of the drop in violence in the 1980s.
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1 Introduction
Interactions between people are typically easier, and hence more intense and frequent, when
they are geographically close. This decay of interaction with increasing distance has been found
to be relevant for various fields in economics. For example, trade economists refer to "iceberg
trade costs" increasing in distance and use "gravity models of trade" to account for the fact that
trade between more distant places is more costly.1 Similarly, textbook models of monopolistic
competition have distance costs built into their very core. Consumer demand for all kinds of
products has been shown to be decreasing in distance. But distance decay is not restricted to
benevolent interactions. Criminologists have found that criminals more frequently commit crimes
closer to home, allowing the computation of "distance-decay functions of crime". Empirical
studies in economics suggest that distance to potential offenders may reduce risk.2 It seems
therefore obvious that geographical distance between actors should also matter for armed conflict.
This is especially true in civil conflict where different parts of the population attack each other.
Yet, theoretical research which separates the location of attackers and targets and models their
interaction in space is extremely scarce.
The purpose of the current paper is to offer a model of violence as a spatial interaction. As a
starting point for our model of civil war we assume that attackers have a base for their operation
and that an attack’s success rate decays with distance to this base.3 In the model we show
that, under some additional assumptions, the expected origins of attacks can be backed out from
the spatial distributions of casualties and population. We also show that our theory of conflict
provides new insights when compared to existing theoretical concepts such as ethnic polarization
or segregation or tools such as spatial econometrics models (see section 2).
1For theoretical foundation see Anderson (1979). For an excellent review see Behar and Venables (2011).
2See, for example, Linden and Rockoff (2008) who show that house prices fall significantly when registered sex
offenders move into a neighbourhood.
3 In civil wars these bases are typically located in neighborhoods which support the attackers through e.g.
personnel, logistics and, crucially, information provision.
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We further apply our model to novel, fine-grained data on the religious dimension of the
Northern Irish conflict. Northern Ireland —being a rare example of a developed country expe-
riencing an intense conflict—provides a unique setting that allows us to match detailed conflict
events and location data with fine-grained census data on the exact number of members from
different religious groups in 582 local administrative wards.
Figure 1, Panel a) illustrates a classic approach towards this data which follows the literature
on ethnic polarization applied to the micro level. On the x-axis we show the polarization score in
each of the 582 wards of Northern Ireland and on the y-axis we display the number of casualties per
1000 population in each of the wards.4 There is no discernable association between polarization
on the ward level and casualties.
This motivates the development of our theory targeted at explaining patterns of violence
at the micro level. Our data together with the model allows us to estimate the distribution
of violence in space. We find that violence observed in a given ward can be explained by the
spatial interaction of different populations, and that increasing the distance between potential
perpetrators and targets has a quantitatively important effect of reducing violence. In particular,
for a given level of fighting motivation, an interaction within ward is 2 to 6 times more dangerous
than between wards. The results are shown to be robust to a variety of alternative assumptions,
alternative samples and alternative treatment of standard errors. A placebo test is also carried
out.
A truly spatial model of the interaction in conflict offers large advantages when predicting
the location of attacks compared to other models. Figure 1, Panel b) shares the same y-axis with
Figure 1, Panel a) but plots on the x-axis our estimate of fighting effort which is derived from
the same population data but based on our micro-founded theory. The positive association with
casualties per capita is clearly visible in the Figure.
4To construct Figure 1 we have used population numbers from the 1971 census (NISRA, 2015) and casualties
from Sutton (1994) and CAIN (2015). The polarization formula is discussed in detail in Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005).
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Figure 1: Understanding Casualties at the Local Level
The explanatory power of the theory is a first, clear advantage of introducing quantitative
estimates of the effect of distance into a standard model of violence. Yet, our model also permits us
to estimate the origin and, hence, path taken by attacks. We illustrate this by using the model to
generate a ward-by-ward analysis of the predicted number of attacks across each ward boundary.
We compare our predictions with the actual placement of barriers by the UK government. It
turns out that we can predict well the placement of these "peace walls" using the expected extent
of violence that travels through a location. We use ward fixed effects at origin and destination to
show that it is the interaction across space, and not ward characteristics per se, that drives the
placement of walls on specific boundaries of a ward.
Finally, our estimates allow us to study how actual changes in the distribution of the popu-
lation might have affected violence, holding transport costs constant. To demonstrate this, we
apply parameter estimates from the beginning of the conflict (the 1970s) to the distribution of
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population in the 1980s. In this way we can predict the biggest reductions of local violence in the
1980s, and show that changes in the composition and distribution of population from the 1970s
to the 1980s can explain large parts of the overall fall of violence in this period.
While the data we use is specific, we believe the model of violence as an interaction across space
to be widely applicable. It is particularly useful for conflict settings of "complex warfare", i.e. civil
conflicts that blur the traditional distinction between insurgency and sectarian violence. Recent
conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, Mali, Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, share elements
with traditional guerrilla warfare, but also feature a large amount of violence between different
religious or ethnic groups.5 A series of estimates of violence decay could also be used to forecast
the violence potential of countries and regions that are currently peaceful.
A caveat applies to our argument. We study how geographical proximity affects the risk of
attacks in an ongoing conflict. This focus makes perfect sense in the short-run when fighting is
acute. However, in the long-run, positive interactions between ethnic or religious groups could
build trust between them and the actual motives for attacks may be reduced (see Rohner, Thoenig
and Zilibotti, 2013). Hence, while bigger geographical distances can indeed reduce the number
of attacks during a conflict (as emphasized by the current paper), in post-conflict reconstruction
"building bridges" and reducing inter-group distance may be important policies to re-enforce
peace. This subtle point has important policy implications: While physically separating groups
(e.g. through so-called "peace lines" in Northern Ireland) may indeed be justifiable while fighting
is still virulent, it may be optimal to tear down such walls once conflict is over and reconciliation
starts.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 links our framework to existing concepts and
surveys the related literature, while in Section 3 we set up a simple formal model of spatial
interaction, predicting the origin and destination of attacks. In Section 4 we discuss the context
of the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland, and present the data, whereas in Section 5 we carry out
5Support by the population plays a key role even in asymmetric civil conflicts like insurgencies. See, for example,
US Army (2006).
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the econometric analysis and present the main results and robustness checks. In Section 6 we
show how the model can be usefully applied to generate novel insights. Section 7 provides a
discussion of external validity and Section 8 concludes. Four appendices provide further details
and results.
2 Links to Existing Concepts and Related Literature
Conceptually, our approach aims to build a bridge between the cross-country conflict literature
and research using micro data. We want to do this by introducing the idea of transport costs
into a canonical model of conflict.6 In this section we first motivate this research agenda from an
empirical perspective and then discuss related literature.
When cross-country studies link ethnic / religious diversity to conflict, their focus lies on
the role of the overall size of different ethnic groups (i.e. ethnic polarization or fractionalization
measures). This corresponds to making the implicit assumption that — for given fixed group
population proportions—the average distance between members of the groups does not matter.
Figure 2 illustrates the shortcomings of this assumption. Both the country of the left panel
and the country of the right panel have the same number of regions (12) and the same level of
nationwide population shares (with ethnic groups A and B being present in 6 regions each in
both countries). However, in the left panel the average distance of a given region populated by
A to the closest region populated by B is far greater than in the right panel where each of the
six A regions is directly bordering some of the six B regions. When one assumes that the cost
of committing attacks is increasing in the distance from the target, then the country in the right
panel faces a higher expected number of attacks, despite the fact that it has the same population
shares as the country to the left. Hence, our model can help to understand country heterogeneity
in violence holding composition constant.
6This approach has been extremely successful in the trade literature with recent contributions by Donaldson
(2018) and Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017) integrating trade models with empirical measures of trade costs to shed
light on the distribution of economic activity across space.
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Figure 2: Two countries with the same ethnic composition but different spatial interaction
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Figure 3: Same level of segregation but different spatial interaction
In addition, a model based on interactions can also take into account features like terrain
characteristics that affect the way that these interactions play out. In Figure 3 we depict an
extreme case. While in the left panel the "barrier" (which can be natural, e.g. a mountain, or
artificial, e.g. a separating wall) is at the country borders, in the right panel it is in the middle
between the two groups. Hence, even for a similar degree of segregation, the level of spatial
interaction can be very different depending on the topology of the interaction (e.g. the location
of barriers). Note that the logic is similar if for example instead of the existance of a barrier
the population density varies across different regions. Conflict incentives would be smaller if low
population density zones are located where the groups are close (i.e. in the second and/or third
row of the left panel of Figure 2) than when they are located at places far away from other groups
(i.e. in the first and/or fourth row of the left panel of Figure 2). Again, even for a similar degree
of segregation, different locations of low and high population density areas can result in very
different patterns of spatial interaction.
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Figure 4: Different violence patterns for the same group constellation
distribution of ethnic groups A and B and two violence distributions. Violence, indicated by a
grey shading, in the example on the left, is concentrated at the boundary between group A and
B, while this is not the case in the right panel.
Note, that the standard method of regressing violence on characteristics within units would
not indicate any difference between these two patterns. Both examples will register a correlation
of violence with characteristic A. Yet, violence in the left panel could also be generated by
attacks of B on A. Hence, ignoring the interaction between groups across space may result in
misinterpretation and erroneous conclusions. Note also that running an existing standard spatial
econometrics regression, such as a Spatial Durbin model (SDM), would not help if violence is
indeed driven by the interaction of A and B.
In terms of particular contributions, our paper is related to the theoretical literature on ethnic
and religious conflict (e.g. Horowitz, 2000; Varshney, 2001; Esteban and Ray, 2008, 2011; Rohner,
2011; Caselli and Coleman, 2013), and the empirical studies linking ethnic diversity to civil war
at the country-year level (see. Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffl er, 2004; Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol, 2005; Cederman and Girardin, 2007; Collier and Rohner, 2008; Collier, Hoeffl er,
and Rohner, 2009; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016).
These papers generally find that ethnic heterogeneity (and in particular ethnic polarization)
increases the risk of conflict, but — contrary to our current contribution — they do not study
the spatial patterns of ethnic violence.7 In a different vein, the impact of segregation is still
7Results in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) suggest hat this might not hold for international wars where genetically
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controversial, with some scholars finding that it increases the risk of ethnic conflict (Diez Medrano,
1994; Olzak et al., 1996), while others argue that "partition", could be a solution to ethnic conflict
(Horowitz, 2000).8
In recent years there has been an increasing number of papers studying violence at a disag-
gregate, local level (e.g. La Ferrara and Harari, 2012; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2013b;
Dube and Vargas, 2013; Berman et al., 2017; König et al., 2017), but most of these contributions
do either not contain a formal model of conflict or do not take into account the local ethnic
composition, usually due to data limitations.9 Also the micro-level literature on insurgency and
counter-insurgency is relevant, see Kalyvas (2006), Lyall (2010), Bhavnani et al (2011), Kocher,
Pepinsky and Kalyvas (2011), and Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011).
Maybe closest to our contribution is the literature focusing on spatial patterns of violence.
There is a small literature in political science studying —inspired by the epidemiological literature
on the spread of diseases— diffusion and clustering patterns of violence over space and time
(Townsley, Johnson, and Ratcliffe, 2008, Schutte and Weidmann, 2011). Further, Novta (2016)
builds a simulation-based model of how conflict spreads. Contrary to our setting of insurgency
and terrorism, her framework is designed to study traditional military warfare between two
standing armies. The features of her model are found to be consistent with the spread of violence
in the 109 municipalities of Bosnia. Novta models the armed groups in each municipality as
separate players who can only attack in their home village while the focus of our framework lies
precisely on the across-ward attacks.10 Bhavnani et al. (2014) link segregation to urban conflict,
using a simulated agent-based model, calibrated for Jerusalem. Finally, the purely empirical
similar populations are engaged more in conflict.
8Sambanis (2000) concludes that partition does not significantly prevent conflict.
9There are also a few papers selecting an intermediate level of disaggregation and building a panel dataset
on the ethnic group level covering a large number of countries (e.g. Buhaug, Cederman, and Rod, 2008; Morelli
and Rohner, 2015; Esteban, Morelli and Rohner, 2015). However, their level of disaggregation is still much less
fine-grained than in the current paper, and they do not focus on local ethnic cleavages and the interaction between
ethnic groups across regions.
10Klasnja and Novta (2016) apply a related framework to Hindu-Muslim riots and the Bosnian Civil War.
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contribution of Balcells, Daniels, and Escribà-Folch (2016) studies post-conflict sectarian clashes
in Northern Ireland from 2005-2012. In a nutshell, a main difference between our current paper
and the existing work on spatial violence patterns is that —contrary to the existing literature—our
empirical analysis estimates the structural parameters of a formal model of optimizing, farsighted
players.
Finally, the predictive power of our framework is also useful when it comes to forecasting the
impact of conflict on economic outcomes. Besley and Mueller (2012) show for Northern Ireland
that compared to peaceful areas, housing in the most violent areas sold for between 2 and 17
percent less - depending on the level of violence, and Mueller (2016) shows that changes in the
distribution of violence within a country can have a substantial impact on aggregate growth.
Thus, predicting well the location of attacks does not only help in forecasting local economic
outcomes, but also countrywide performance.
3 Model
In this section we provide a game-theoretic model of local violence, where two groups are in a
contest about appropriating rents. In line with the conflict economics literature, the share of
rents grabbed by a group depends on its relative fighting effort. In our setting, the two groups
locally recruit fighters for attacking a weighted average of opponents nearby. It turns out that
this simple framework will allow us to predict the spatial distribution of violence in Northern
Ireland to a stunning degree.
3.1 Set Up
In this one-period framework we model violence in a country with n regions indexed by i. In
each region live two groups labelled, to fix ideas, g ∈ {c, p}. The population of group g in region








Violence in these regions is conducted by two paramilitary groups that recruit themselves







The central leaderships of each of the two paramilitary groups want to maximize the share of
rents R that they capture. These rents can be thought of as nationwide gains of holding power,
which we assume to be private goods.
For the purpose of rent-maximization both group leaderships have to decide simultaneously
on recruiting the optimal number of local fighters in each region.





where Ag are total attacks inflicted by group g, A−g are attacks inflicted by group −g. Note,
that, in order to make the model solvable, we distinguish attacks from casualties which are a
random outcome. In other words, we assume that the competition for rents is affected by how
many attacks the group makes and not how deadly they are.
Recruiting fighters is costly. Typically, salary costs of fighters should be thought of as convex,
as the first few hirings will be cheap given that it will be feasible to target exclusively individuals
with low wages in the regular economy (and hence low opportunity costs of fighting) and/or with
low moral costs of killing. When extending the pool of fighters in a region, the group also needs
to recruit individuals with better outside options and higher moral costs who will require higher
monetary compensation.
Further, the larger the population of locals of a given group in a given region the cheaper the
hiring costs, as the fighters face lower risks of identification and being arrested and can benefit
from more local support and safehouses.










where µ ≥ 0.
This functional form has several advantages. First of all, using a square term of the effort
variable (and normalizing by 1/2) is the simplest way of capturing convexity, and has been used
in a large number of contributions in different fields of economics. Second, the term (Ngi )
µ is
very flexible: If µ = 1, then the costs of recruiting for group g drop with higher population from
group g; if µ = 0, local support doesn’t matter in the sense that the costs of recruiters scales only
with the total number of fighters in the region. We find that µ ≈ 1 yields the best fit to the data
which indicates that local support for the fighting effort is important.
The number of attacks is a function of the available targets and their proximity. We model
interaction across space flexibly by defining a group-specific symmetric spatial weights matrix
Wg =
(
















with wgij = w
g
ji for all i, j. The spatial weight w
g
ij parametrizes how costly it is for group g
to project violence from region i to region j. The number of attacks perpetrated by group g















where −g denotes the opposite group. This means that attacks launched from i by g are the
interaction of the number of perpetrators (fighters) in i and the spatially weighted number of






















3.2 Characterization of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium is determined by the number of fighters that each group recruits in each region.
Each group has to optimally select recruiting numbers for every region, F gi , given the number of
fighters that the other group recruits. Hence, we will obtain a system of 2×n first-order conditions
(FOC) and 2× n unknowns. Given that in each FOC the benefits of a marginal recruit (i.e. the
first term) are strictly concave, while the marginal costs (i.e. the second term) are strictly convex,
the second-order conditions (SOC) hold and there is a unique interior equilibrium.







which implies that the incentive to recruit fighters locally will be a weighted function of the
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)2R× (Wgi )′N−g(Ngi )µ. (2)













µ is the weighted sum of all population in group −g interacted with (Ngi )µ. The
easier it is to recruit, i.e. the higher (Ngi )
µ, the more fighters will be recruited locally. Further,
the more targets are in reach, i.e. the higher (Wgi )
′
N−g, the more fighters will be recruited.
In the empirical analysis we will be able to make use of the fact that the relative fighting effort
between regions is only a function of demographic exogenous variables and the effectiveness of
fighting captured by the spatial weights wgij . While the absolute magnitude of the w
g
ij parameters




ij if dist(i′, j) > dist(i, j),
and wgij′ < w
g
ij if dist(i, j′) > dist(i, j). In other words, we expect effectiveness to decrease in
distance.
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Given the equilibrium number of fighters originating from each region it is easy to calculate







F̃−g + εi, (3)




)2R× diag [(W−g)′Ng] (N−g)µ, (4)






is a matrix with the
values of (W−g)′Ng on the diagonal and zero otherwise.11 The error term εi, with E(εi) = 0,
in equation (3) reflects the fact that there is some randomness in the transmission from attacks
to casualties. Not all successfully carried out attacks do result in the same number of fatalities,
which is the variable observed by the econometrician.
Equation (3) captures the essence of our theory. Violence at location i is the result of an
interaction between targets in location i, Ngi , and the number of attackers based in all locations,
F̃−g. How dangerous these interactions are for the population at i depends on the vector of
weightsW−gi . Note, however, that the full weighting matrix for all locations,W
−g, also plays a
role (through F̃−g) because it determines how many fighters are recruited by the other group.
Thus, a general fall in transport costs (increase in w−gij ) has two effects. First, fighters in
the neighborhood of i are more effective and therefore attack more in region i. This is the effect
coming from W−gi in equation (3). Second, more fighters are recruited in all other locations
because they can attack more effectively in their respective neighborhoods. This effect is captured
by the matrixW−g in equation (4).








































4 Empirical Implementation: The Data
The structural parameters of the model are estimated using data from the conflict in Northern
Ireland. This is one of the most important and costliest conflicts in a developed country over
the last decades. Studying the Northern Irish "Troubles" allows us to draw on very fine grained
group location and fighting event location data. Below we shall start by describing the context
of this conflict, before providing a detailed description of the data used.
4.1 Context of Conflict in Northern Ireland
The Northern part of Ireland, Ulster, has been religiously divided since its conquest by England
and the Reformation, taking both place in the 16th century.12 Since then the Catholic popu-
lation from Gaelic Irish origin and the Protestant population of English and Scottish settlers
have lived "separate lives" characterized by very stable patterns of land holdings and relatively
few religiously mixed marriages (Mulholland, 2002). When the Republic of Ireland achieved
independence from Britain in 1922, the six Northern counties of Ireland remained part of the
UK.
In the early 1920s "Troubles" broke out with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) challenging
British authority over Ulster and engaging in violent combats against the British troops and
Protestant paramilitary organizations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The following
decades were characterized by "home rule" and the new Parliament of Northern Ireland at Stor-
mont near Belfast. The political divide persisted between the Catholic Nationalists (also called
Republicans) who wanted to join the Republic of Ireland and the Protestant Unionists (also called
Loyalists) who wanted to remain united with the UK.
While in the 1950s and early 1960s there were relatively low levels of political violence, in
1968 the situation became again more confrontational when the Civil Rights Movements asked
for more rights for Catholic citizens. Some of the initially peaceful demonstrations and marches
12This subsection draws heavily on Mulholland (2002).
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were met with repression and resulted in fatalities. From August 1969 onwards sectarian violence
exploded. In September 1969 radical militants took control of the previously dormant IRA and
created its radical wing, the Provisional IRA. The "Provos" achieved an ever tighter grip over
traditional Catholic working class strongholds like the Falls Road in Belfast or the Bogside in
Derry.
Further, alarmed by the rise of the IRA and the seeming willingness of the UK government to
make political concessions, loyalist paramilitary organizations stepped up in the 1970s, intimidat-
ing Catholic families from mixed and Protestant areas and starting a violent campaign against
civilian Catholics.
After 1976 the UK built up a stronger Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) that together with
the British Army and the SAS troops stepped up efforts to militarily weaken the IRA. This effort
led the loyalist paramilitaries to lower their violence and the IRA to retrieve from large-scale
open confrontations and to adopt a cellular structure common in terrorist organizations.
Even carefully planned attacks by the paramilitary groups had to rely on operational centres
based on religion. Dillon (1999), for example, describes an IRA operation in October 1972 as
follows:
"The intelligence offi cer of the 1st Battalion said Twinbrook was the best for an assault on
the laundry van [...]. He reckoned that if the van was attacked in Twinbrook an IRA unit could
make an escape with ease and be in the safety of the Andersontown district within a matter of
five to ten minutes."(Dillon 1999, page 42).
In Andersontown the 1971 census counted 5588 Catholics and 51 Protestants. The quote
shows that the IRA was operating from and around this Catholic ward. This made attacks on
Protestants and state forces close to Andersontown more likely.
4.2 Data from Northern Ireland
We use two main data sources. Data on religious composition is from the UK 1971 census and
is provided by NISRA (2015). Most data on violence comes from Sutton (1994) and has been
updated by the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) website (CAIN, 2015). We use address
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data in the description of killings to derive geo-references data. We then use these references to
match killings to wards and grid-cells. The violence data is unique as it reports the religion of
each victim (unless for members of the state forces) and the group that attacked him or her.
We have data on 582 wards (our unit of analysis), which are regrouped into 101 larger District
Electoral Areas (DEA) which again map into 26 local government districts.13 Table 1 shows the
summary statistics of the most relevant variables. The number of Catholics and Protestants are
in thousands. Table 1 also summarizes our data on conflict-related casualties. The special feature
of this data is that it reports the group affi liation of victims of violence.
We first notice that while the average number of casualties per ward is relatively small, the
variance is very large. While in many wards no fatalities occur, the most violent ward records
97 casualties. We further see that casualties are relatively evenly split between catholic and
protestant victims and that there is a large heterogeneity in the group composition of wards and
their neighborhood.
In our main analysis we focus on the settlement patterns and violence data from the 1970s,
when most of the violence takes place. Table 1 shows that there are 3.14 casualties on average per
ward in the 1970s and 1.25 casualties in the 1980s. In a sensitivity test, we also show robustness of
the findings when including the 1980s. We focus on the first decade (1970s) to ensure that reverse
causality between settlement patterns and violence are less of a concern. Since the census data
is from the start of the respective decade we should be able to capture the effect of settlement
patterns before violence broke out. It is much harder to argue this for the 1980s or 1990s. For
this reason we focus on a cross-section of wards for the 1970s (the potential endogeneity of the
1980s and 1990s census population data prevents us from making use of the panel structure over
the three decades).
Figure 5 below illustrates the type of data we use, focusing on a part of Belfast for a particu-
13The wards are from the District Electoral Areas (Northern Ireland) Order 1993. These boundaries
have been revised in 2014. A list of 1993 wards and their corresponding DEAs can be found under
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1993/226/made.
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Data from the 1970s Observations Mean SD Min Max
casualties 582 3.14 8.63 0 97
catholic casualties 582 1.45 4.71 0 62
protestant casualties 582 1.69 4.46 0 46
catholics (in 1000s) 582 1.18 1.08 0 9.72
protestants (in 1000s) 582 1.45 1.88 0 14.42
catholics in direct
neighbourhood (in 1000s) 582 7.08 4.91 0.36 32.84
protestants in direct
neighbourhood (in 1000s) 582 8.07 10.37 0.00 76.97
catholics in two wards
distance (in 1000s) 582 16.45 9.46 0.92 51.25
protestants in two wards
distance (in 1000s) 582 18.32 21.77 0.21 138.51
Data from the 1980s Observations Mean SD Min Max
casualties 582 1.25 2.54 0 19
catholic casualties 582 0.48 1.36 0 11
protestant casualties 582 0.77 1.61 0 13
catholics (in 1000s) 582 1.44 0.84 0.04 5
protestants (in 1000s) 582 1.07 1.33 0.00 7
catholics in direct
neighbourhood (in 1000s) 582 8.61 4.40 1.04 23
protestants in direct
neighbourhood (in 1000s) 582 5.82 7.24 0.00 45
catholics in two wards
distance (in 1000s) 582 19.74 9.78 1.86 58
protestants in two wards
distance (in 1000s) 582 13.09 15.61 0.00 97
Notes: From CAIN (2015), Sutton (1994) and NISRA (2015). We code casualties of the state forces as
protestant casualties if a ward has casualties whose religion is not revealed.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
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Figure 5: Map of inner Belfast wards with information on demographics and fatalities
larly violent period of the conflict (1969-1976). Our data contain information on the demographic
composition of all administrative wards (with the white area in the upper-right corner depicting
the sea), as well as information on the location and religious affi liation of all recorded fatalities.
In line with our theory we see that many fatalities take place in either religiously mixed wards
or in religiously homogeneous wards located close to strongholds of the other religious commu-
nity. In contrast, religiously homogenous wards located far away from the other religious group
experience only small levels of violence.
5 Estimations
One unique feature of our setting and data is that it allows us to estimate the decay of distance
parameters captured by the spatial weights matrix Wg. In this section we first estimate Wg
and then demonstrate the dramatic gains the estimated model brings towards understanding the
distribution of violence.
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5.1 Estimation of the Decay of Distance Parameters
Applying the model (see equation (3)) to Northern Ireland, we now label the Protestants (p) and
Catholics (c) killed in some region (ward) j as caspj and cas
c
j , respectively. The data on Northern
Ireland do not allow R to be identified, so we normalize it to 1. We also normalize the parameter
µ to 1 (but show in the Appendix B that a maximum likelihood grid search indeed suggests µ
to be around 1, and that the results are robust to other values of µ). Again, for the sake of
tractability, we shall first focus on within ward violence and on violence between neighbors of the
first degree. In a second step, we will also consider violence between higher degree neighbors.
For the empirical estimation, we shall assume that the spatial weight for within-ward interac-
tions is the same in all wards, i.e. wgii = w
g
jj . Similarly, the spatial weight for direct neighboring
wards is assumed to be the same for all neighbor pairs, i.e. if i, j, l are a triad of neighboring




jl. For simplicity, we label these coeffi cients of interest of the spatial
weights matrixWg as kg0 , g = {c, p} , for within-ward violence (i.e. where w
g
ij has i = j), and as
kg1 for direct neighboring wards (i.e. with w
g
ij where i and j are direct neighboring wards).
With these assumptions we can simplify equation (3). Call n1(j) the neighboring wards of
j. We can then write casualties suffered by groups p or c in ward j as a function of targets, Ngj ,
interacted with the number of attackers F̃−gj and F̃
−g







F̃c + εj (5)
= Npj







kp0F̃ pj + kp1 ∑
i∈n1(j)
F̃ pi
+ εj , (6)



















Note, that equations (7) and (8) indicate that the recruitment of attackers is driven by the
respective neighborhood. This implies that, in order to estimate equations (5) and (6), we need
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES protestant casualties protestant casualties catholic casualties catholic casualties
k0 10.88*** 9.98*** 10.48*** 9.68**
(0.93) (1.43) (2.79) (4.51)
k1 1.77*** 1.20*** 2.94*** 1.63
(0.11) (0.40) (0.38) (2.44)
k2 0.41 0.91
(0.35) (0.94)
p value: k0=k1 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.23
p value: k0=k2 . 0.00 . 0.02
p value: k1=k2 . 0.29 . 0.83
Observations 582 582 582 582
R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.76 0.77
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the electoral district level (101
clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Protestant casualties" are casualties of state forces and protestants.
"Catholic casualties" are casualties of catholics. The model's parameter "mu" (determining how the recruitment of
fighters relies on local population) is normalized to 1. "k0-k2" are decay parameters. k0 captures the transport cost of
conducting attacks within the same ward. k1 captures the transport cost of conducting attacks in the direct (bordering)
neighbourhood of the ward. k2 captures the transport cost of crossing one ward to carry out an attack. In columns (1)
and (2) we report the k parameters of catholic paramilitaries and in columns (3) and (4) we report the k parameters of
protestant armed groups.
Table 2: Main estimation of the spatial weight parameters, separately for protestant and catholic
casualties
data for the composition of the direct neighborhood and data for the composition of the neighbor’s
direct neighborhood. Variation in the neighborhood composition is essential for our identification
strategy.
We take the number of casualties caused by the two groups as the best estimate for the
number of equilibrium attacks, Ãp and Ãc, and assume that all protestant victims and casualties
amongst the state forces were caused by catholic fighters and that all catholic victims were caused
by protestant fighters. This brings Ãc + Ãp as close as possible to the total number of casualties
while still using information on the violence perpetuated by the two sides in the conflict.
Table 2 displays the results of our estimates of the spatial weight parameters in our model.
The parameter kg0 captures the effectiveness of attacks within the same ward, k
g
1 captures the
effectiveness of attacks in the direct (bordering) neighborhood of the ward, and kg2 captures the
effectiveness of attacks of second-degree neighbors. We estimate the expressions for caspj , and
cascj , from equations (5) and (6), respectively, running a non-linear regression (see Davidson and
MacKinnon, 1993) and let the estimator pick the values of kg0 , k
g
1 , and k
g
2 that maximize the
21
fit.14 Focussing in column (1) on violence against Protestants and on kc0 and k
c
1 only, we find that
all k-coeffi cients are precisely estimated (both significant at the 1 percent level) and that kc0 is
substantially larger than kc1, showing a clear decay. In line with our hypotheses, there is indeed a
cost of projecting violence over distance, and the attacks decay across ward borders. According
to the estimates of column (1), the violence potential originating from a given ward is about six
times smaller when the ward border needs to be crossed than within-ward.
In column (2), also second degree neighboring wards are included in the analysis (kc2). Again,
the k-coeffi cient gradually decreases when crossing an additional ward border, displaying a clear-




0. Columns (3)-(4) display similar estimations for catholic casualties.
The coeffi cients of kp0 and k
p
1 are somewhat comparable to the ones found for protestant fatalities
in columns (1)-(2), and the ratio of kg1/k
g
0 is of a similar magnitude (i.e. roughly four) as in
columns (1)-(2) (i.e. roughly six). In column (4) we again include second degree neighboring
wards. While the qualitative picture of column (4) is very similar to column (2), the coeffi cients
are less precisely estimated.
It is important to stress that the similarity of results in columns (1) and (3) are not a given.
Many wards had large catholic or protestant majorities so that population composition varied
dramatically between Protestants and Catholics in 1971. This means that the variation used to
identify the parameters kc0 and k
c





As mentioned above, in Table 2 we have normalized the model’s parameter µ (that determines
how the recruitment of fighters relies on local population) to 1. Given that it seems diffi cult to
find a reliable proxy for µ, this is a reasonable way of proceeding. We include two additional
robustness tables, relaxing this normalization. First, we perform a maximum likelihood grid
search, yielding the value of µ that maximizes the overall fit of the model. The results are
14We use non-linear-least squares to fit the equation. We have also estimated parameters with maximum like-
lihood under the assumption of a negative binomial (overdispersion is a clear problem in the data). Results are
qualitatively similar with precisely estimated k0, k1 and k0 > k1 but point estimates are lower and the model fit is
worse.
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displayed in Table 9 in Appendix B, which replicates Table 2, but using the µ found in the grid
search. First of all, note that in all four columns the µ found is always in the neighborhood of
1, ranging from 0.78 to 1.18. Second, the estimated coeffi cients of kg0 , k
g
1 , and k
g
2 are similar in
terms of size to the ones found in the baseline Table 2.
Further, we also replicate the key results of Table 2 for different values of µ around 1. In
particular, in Table 3 we show that our results for the direct neighborhood go through for µ =
0.5, µ = 0.75, µ = 1.25 and µ = 1.5. Panel A reports the results for protestant casualties and
Panel B reports the results for Catholic casualties. The relative size of the coeffi cients changes
but kg1 < k
g
0 is always maintained. The estimated parameters fall for larger values of µ. This
can be explained by the fact that higher values of µ imply more fighters per population. If the
number of fighters increases, effectiveness of these fighters needs to decrease in order to maintain
the level of violence. Also, estimates for kg0 fall relative to k
g
1 for larger values of µ. This change
is driven by large mixed wards which generate a lot more within-ward violence for large µ due
to the non-linearity in the recruitment technology. Note that we find that catholic casualties are
best described (highest R2) by a slightly lower µ (close to 0.75 as opposed to close to 1.25 for
protestant casualties). This could be explained by the fact that protestant fighters include state
forces which we expect to move more freely and therefore are less bound by local support by
Protestants.
Our framework also allows us to estimate the total combined death toll of Protestants and
Catholics, casj ≡ caspj + cascj , relying again on the structural equations (5) and (6). This is what
we do in Table 4. In particular, we allow for different kcm 6= k
p
m, but assume that the relative






m, for m = 1, 2...M .
This is reasonable in the light of Table 2 that indeed found for both population groups similar
spatial weight ratios of k0/k1, and k1/k2. It implies that we can replace the ratio kcm/k
p
m by a
constant for all m. Call Mc ≡ (kcm/k
p
m)2. We can then write casualties in ward j as
caspj + cas
c
j = Mc ×N
p
j










Panel A: protestant casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES mu=0.5 mu=0.75 mu=1.25 mu=1.5
k0 18.56*** 13.82*** 8.64*** 6.71***
(3.85) (1.86) (0.57) (0.78)
k1 1.48** 1.84*** 1.55*** 1.31***
(0.62) (0.21) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 582 582 582 582
R-squared 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.59
Panel B:  catholic casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES mu=0.5 mu=0.75 mu=1.25 mu=1.5
k0 12.41* 12.13*** 8.56*** 6.73***
(7.09) (3.00) (2.64) (1.91)
k1 5.24*** 3.89*** 2.24*** 1.70***
(1.45) (0.66) (0.30) (0.18)
Observations 582 582 582 582
R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.74 0.73
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the electoral district level
(101 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Protestant casualties" are casualties of state forces and
protestants. "Catholic casualties" are casualties of catholics. "k0-k1" are decay parameters. k0 captures the
transport cost of conducting attacks within the same ward. k1 captures the transport cost of conducting
attacks in the direct (bordering) neighbourhood of the ward. Different columns display results with different
assumptions on the parameter mu which captures how the cost of fighter recruitment changes with group
size.
Table 3: Robustness of main specification with respect to mu
24
where εj is the error term of the combined regression, F
p
i is given by equation (8), and F̃
′c
i
corresponds to F̃ ci of equation (7) besides the fact that k
c
m is replaced by k
p
m.
This combined estimation of casj also allows us to compute the relative "aggressiveness of
catholic paramilitaries compared to state forces and loyalist paramilitaries", captured by the pa-
rameterMc, which intuitively tells us how many attacks are carried out by Catholics compared to
Protestants for a given availability and proximity of targets. Mc < 1 mean that catholic paramil-
itaries carry out less attacks than protestant fighters for a given availability of targets, while
Mc > 1 implies that catholic fighters are relatively more "aggressive". The interpretation of Mc
of course requires caution, as any Mc 6= 1 could be due to various factors such as e.g. differences
in motivation, organization or logistical capacity of paramilitary groups, differences in population
support, advantages and constraints related to being linked to the political establishment etc.
Our data do not allow us to disentangle the root causes driving the value of Mc.
Table 4 performs this joint estimation of total casualties, and shows that indeed there is
a gradual decay of attack potential when crossing ward borders, with all k-coeffi cients being




0. It is particularly re-assuring that the point estimates




0 in Table 2. Further, theMc coeffi cient is estimated
to be around 0.6, revealing that for an identical availability and proximity of targets, assuming
everything else constant, catholic paramilitaries carry out roughly 20 percent less attacks than
protestant forces.15
A crucial aspect to keep in mind is that, while kp0 > k
p
1, the latter parameter applies to
a lot more interactions. The neighborhood contains a population that is more than five times
larger than the population of the average ward. This implies that more than half of all attacks,
according to the specification of Table 4, take place across ward boundaries.16





16For a more detailed discussion see the Appendix C.
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(1) (2)









p value: k0=k1 0.02 0.22
p value: k0=k2 . 0.04
p value: k1=k2 . 0.08
Observations 582 582
R-squared 0.78 0.79
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the electoral district level
(101 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The model's parameter "mu" (determining how the recruitment
of fighters relies on local population) is normalized to 1. "k0-k2" are decay parameters. k0 captures the
transport cost of conducting attacks within the same ward for state forces and loyalists (kp0 in the text). k1
captures the transport cost of conducting attacks in the direct (bordering) neighbourhood of the ward for
state forces and loyalists. k2 captures the transport cost of crossing one ward to carry out an attack for state
forces and loyalists. Mc captures the relative aggressiveness of republican paramilitaries compared to state
forces and loyalists, (kc/kp)^2.
Table 4: Main estimation of the decay parameters, protestant and catholic casualties combined
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5.2 Comparison to Alternative Models
A clear advantage of modeling the local interaction of the local population is a gain in the
explanatory power of the model. In order to show this we consider two benchmarks. The first
benchmark is an alternative framework where only ward population characteristics matter and
where, accordingly, the violence potential is assumed to fully decay when a ward-border is crossed.
Put differently, this corresponds to a setting often encountered in within-country studies in which
the location of attacks and targets is not separated.
We model this alternative by regressing ward-level casualties on the numbers of Protestants
and Catholics in a given ward and their interaction. In Appendix B, Table 10 depicts the
regression results for this alternative specification in column (1).17
Figure 6 below displays a comparison of our setting (called "model") with the benchmark
alternative model of full distance decay of the Appendix Table 10, column (1) (called "bench-
mark"). The curves represent the distribution of the residuals, i.e. casj − ĉasj . Large numbers
mean that the extent of violence is underestimated. In the benchmark model we predict violence
with the population composition and interactions within the ward, whereas ĉasj in our model is
given by the fitted values from equation (9). The curve capturing our model is drawn in a dashed
red line, while the benchmark curve is drawn in a blue solid line. The curve of our setting is
centered around zero and reaches a very high kernel density close to zero. This reveals that the
fit is very good, with most wards having very similar levels of actual and fitted casualties. In
contrast, the alternative model has a substantially lower fit, revealed by a larger spread away from
zero (running an F-test confirms at the 1% level of significance that the alternative benchmark
has a larger standard deviation of the error terms). The alternative model slightly overestimates
violence in a large number of wards and grossly underestimates it in a few other wards. This is
not only a result of not taking cross-border attacks into account but also of ignoring the changes
17 In column (2) of the Appendix Table 10 we display another alternative specification which is also common in
the literature. This specification ignores population size and predicts casualties with the share of catholics and its
square. This specification has almost no predictive power.
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Figure 6: Our model compared to full decay
in motivation to fight in areas with a lot of potential targets.18
The second natural benchmark to consider is a model assuming no decay of violence potential
over space. This is the implicit assumption of many country-level studies assuming that only the
overall population composition but not their location matters (see Figure 2). According to this
"no spatial decay" benchmark the population composition in a given ward and in its neighborhood
should only affect casualties through the nationwide presence of potential victims, i.e. this boils







This simply means that total casualties of group g will be distributed according to where group g
18To see this, imagine that k1 is set to 0. This has two effects: First, even if the recruitment of fighters
was unchanged, their effectiveness would decrease. Second, the effect is anticipated and recruitment of fighters
decreases. We discuss this in detail in Appendix A.
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Figure 7: Our model compared to no decay




j and casj − ĉasj . In Figure 7 we compare the
fit of our setting (called "model", depicted by the red dashed curve) with this no decay benchmark
(called "benchmark", displayed by the blue solid line). This reveals a substantially less good fit of
the no decay benchmark, with violence in many wards being drastically underestimated (running
an F-test confirms at the 1% level of significance that the alternative benchmark has a larger
standard deviation of the error terms).
5.3 Robustness Checks
This subsection will be devoted to our main robustness checks on clustering and alternative
location subsamples or time frames.
Table 5 shows that the statistical inference is robust to various levels of clustering standard
errors. One natural alternative option for clustering would be at the parliamentary constituency
or district level, although unfortunately the number of parliamentary constituencies and districts
are only 18 and 26, respectively, which is below the typical lower bound of clusters required (50).







district council level no clustering
VARIABLES all casualties all casualties all casualties
k0 8.30*** 8.30*** 8.30***
(1.80) (0.55) (3.01)
k1 3.45*** 3.45*** 3.45***
(0.28) (0.06) (0.54)
Mc 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63***
(0.10) (0.03) (0.14)
Observations 582 582 582
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.78
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Protestant
casualties" are casualties of state forces and protestants. "Catholic casualties" are
casualties of catholics. "mu" is normalized to 1. "k0-k2" are decay parameters. k0
captures the transport cost of conducting attacks within the same ward. k1
captures the transport cost of conducting attacks in the direct neighbourhood of the
ward. k2 captures the transport cost crossing one ward to conduct an attack. Mc
captures the relative aggressiveness of republican paramilitaries compared to state
forces and loyalists (as detailed in the text). There are 18 parliamentary
constituencies and 26 district councils.
Table 5: Alternative clustering of standard errors
(2) of Table 5, the significance is maintained at the 1 percent level for all coeffi cients. In column
(3) we show that the results are also robust when clustering is absent altogether.19
Table 6 shows that the results continue to hold when fixed effects are included or particular
parts of Northern Ireland are excluded. In columns (1) and (2), we include fixed effects at
the parliamentary constituency, resp. electoral district level. The magnitude and statistical
significance of the estimates remains very similar to our baseline results. In column (3) the
19We have also checked out the sensitivity to clustering by the coordinates of the wards and on a combination
of coordinates and population using a k-means clustering. Our results are robust to this.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
parl. constituency level
fixed effects
electoral district area fixed
effects
dropping districts of
Belfast dropping districts of Derry
only districts of Belfast and
Derry
Dep. Var. all casualties all casualties all casualties all casualties all casualties
k0 9.92*** 10.15*** 21.92*** 7.88*** 8.38***
(1.77) (1.95) (7.14) (1.66) (1.80)
k1 2.89*** 1.60** 7.14*** 3.47*** 3.39***
(0.43) (0.74) (0.78) (0.27) (0.29)
Mc 0.68*** 1.47** 0.08 0.64*** 0.65***
(0.07) (0.72) (0.15) (0.06) (0.14)
Observations 582 582 531 552 81
R-squared 0.83 0.87 0.38 0.80 0.86
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the electoral district level (101 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Protestant
casualties" are casualties of state forces and protestants. "Catholic casualties" are casualties of catholics. "mu" is normalized to 1. "k0-k2" are decay parameters.
k0 captures the transport cost of conducting attacks within the same ward. k1 captures the transport cost of conducting attacks in the direct neighbourhood of the
ward. k2 captures the transport cost crossing one ward to conduct an attack. Mc captures the relative aggressiveness of republican paramilitaries compared to
state forces and loyalists (as detailed in the text). There are 18 parliamentary constituencies and 101 electoral district areas.
Table 6: Fixed effects and alternative location samples
Belfast area is dropped from the sample. This was by far the most violent part of Northern
Ireland with more than 850 casualties. The decay of violence across distance is still clear-cut,
with k1 < k0 still holding, and both k0 and k1 being highly statistically significant. In column (4)
we drop Derry, the second most violent area from the sample. In column (5) we include instead
in the sample only the wards of Belfast and Derry. In all cases our results continue to hold. This
shows that our findings are not driven by particular regions within Northern Ireland.
Further, Table 7 considers alternative time frames. Using religious group settlement patterns
and violence data from the 1970s was the natural choice for the baseline regressions, as this
reflects pre-conflict location decisions, which are arguably more exogenous than the people’s
location choices in the 1980s. Still, in Table 7 we show robustness of our main results to the
inclusion of data from the 1980s. In particular, in columns (1) and (2) we use data from the
1970s and 1980s to show that parameters do not change significantly from one decade to the
next. In particular, in column (1) we first estimate the same set of parameters as in the baseline
regressions, but for a larger sample containing also data from the 1980s, leading to a similar
overall pattern as in the baseline regressions. Then we estimate in column (2) the difference
between parameters in the 1970s to 1980s.20 To do this we run a regression in which we separate










VARIABLES all casualties all casualties all casualties
k0 9.56*** 9.61*** -14.85
(2.24) (2.03) (15.14)
k1 4.01*** 3.99*** 11.17***
(0.39) (0.31) (1.20)
k0 change - 80s -2.49
(8.78)
k1 change - 80s 0.50
(1.10)
Mc 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.50***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.17)
Mc change - 80s -0.19
(0.23)
Observations 1,164 1,164 582
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.67
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the electoral
district level (101 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The model's parameter "mu"
(determining how the recruitment of fighters relies on local population) is normalized to 1. "k0-k2"
are decay parameters. k0 captures the transport cost of conducting attacks within the same ward.
k1 captures the transport cost of conducting attacks in the direct (bordering) neighbourhood of the
ward. Mc captures the relative aggressiveness of republican paramilitaries compared to state
forces and loyalists (as detailed in the text).
Table 7: Alternative time windows
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the 1970s and 1980s through two sets of spatial weight dummies. We use “k0 in the 80s”= “k0 in
the 70s”+ “k0 change 80s”to replace for “k0 in the 80s”in the regression equation and estimate
two k0 parameters: “k0 in the 70s”and “k0 change 80s”. We do the same for the k1 parameters
and Mc. We do this in order to be able to conveniently test whether parameters changed from
the 1970s to the 1980s, finding that coeffi cients are stable over time.
The fact that estimates over different decades are similar could be due to either the structure
of our model applying to various periods, or, alternatively, due to the fact that population
movements across Northern Ireland are limited. To discriminate between these two explanations,
we perform a placebo test in column (3). Concretely, we try to explain the violence in the 1970s
with settlement patterns in the 1980s. If the composition of the population is highly persistent
we should find the same result as in the previous two columns, while if population movements
are substantial the placebo test should generate results that are not in line with the first two
columns. This is exactly what we observe in column (3), suggesting that the stability of the
estimates in columns (1) and (2) is not driven by the absence of population movements. This is
consistent with the view that indeed the structure of our model applies to various sub-periods of
the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland.
6 Uses of the Model for Prediction
Our model builds on the assumption that the starting position of an attack is separated from the
location of the attack. Given the parameter estimates of the model from the previous section,
we can "invert" the model to calculate where attacks came from and which path they took. It
is diffi cult to overemphasize the importance of this for the use of disaggregated data. The more
disaggregated the data is, the more often will the location of a target and the origin of violence
differ. Especially for the analysis of and response to sectarian violence taking this into account
can be crucial.
In this section we first discuss where attacks came from. Then we show that the UK gov-
ernment has built walls to inhibit attacks exactly on those ward boundaries where our model
predicts a lot of cross-border attacks. This indicates that the model captures parts of the reality
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of the conflict as it was perceived by its participants. Finally, we use our model to show that
changes in the spatial composition of population reduced violence dramatically, despite the fact
that total population did not change as much.
6.1 Predicting the Origin of Attacks
Our model enables us to compute the expected size of bilateral attacks from any ward against
any other ward. Generally, we are able to calculate the number of attacks originating in a given












In the simplified model in Table 4, column (1) we have estimated three parameters. From
















N ci , (11)

















F̂ pi , (12)



















The subtle differences between equation (11) and equation (12) illustrate the intuition of
the empirical model. While casualties in equation (11) (i.e. deaths caused) are calculated by
multiplying the number of fighters in ward j with the sum of potential targets in the neighborhood,
casualties in equation (12) (i.e. deaths suffered) are calculated by multiplying the number of
targets in ward j with the sum of fighters in the neighborhood.
Figure 8 displays for each ward on the y-axis the number of attacks originated in a given ward
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Figure 8: Origin and destination of attacks in the 1970s.
are further away from the origin. Wards with a balanced in- and outflow of attacks are located
close to the 45 degree line while "net contributors" (i.e. wards that create more violence than
they suffer) are located above the 45 degree line.21
An interesting feature of Figure 8 is that wards with low levels of violence tend to receive more
attacks than they commit. However, this reverses for violent wards. This pattern is a feature of
a model in which recruitment of fighters, F gj , is endogenous. Wards with a large population will
generate higher F̃ gj and attack surrounding wards more. A smaller ward next to a larger ward
will therefore become a net recipient of violence. We provide a detailed explanation of this point
using simulations of the model in Appendix C.
Overall there are quite stark differences between how much violence the population in a ward
21 If we included attacks that did not cross ward boundaries this would move points to the north-east in parallel
to the 45 degree line.
35
causes as opposed to how much it suffers. In particular, it is not uncommon that wards receive
twice as many attacks as they commit. On the other hand, the most violent ward commits about
20 casualties more than it receives.
6.2 Predicting the Location of Peacewalls
To gauge the plausibility of the model we use detailed data on the position of the barriers built
by the UK government to prevent sectarian violence. Many of these walls were built directly on
or close to ward boundaries. The fact that we have a full description of origins and targets allows
us to predict how many attacks must have crossed each of the 1632 ward boundaries in Northern
Ireland. Walls were built with the explicit goal to prevent this.
We have collected data from various sources on 36 peacewalls which were built on ward
boundaries (see data description in Appendix D). We then take the estimates from column 1
in Table 4 and calculate for each of the 3,264 dyads of neighboring wards the total number of
attacks crossing the boundary between them.22 Similar to the formulas in equations (11) and
(12), the formula for attacks crossing the ward boundary between ward i and j is
̂attacks
e
























This variable has a mean of 0.47, a standard deviation of 2.1 and a maximum of 33. If our model
is a good description of the reality in Northern Ireland we expect the UK government to build
barriers where most violence crossed the ward boundary. In order to do so we use as a dependant
variable a dummy indicating whether a wall was built between two wards. This variable has a
mean of 0.022, i.e. there is a very low baseline risk of receiving a barrier.
In Table 8 we assess whether the number of predicted attacks using our model is able to explain
the authorities’decisions to construct peace walls. In particular, we do not take the actually
22Each pair of wards i and j appears twice. We conduct the analysis at the dyad level in order to be able
to control for ward fixed effects on both sides of the boundary. We cluster at the boundary level to rule out
double-counting biasing the statistical inference.
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observed attacks (which are an endogenous variable), but the expected numbers of attacks when
feeding the pre-conflict population data in our structural model. Thus, all actual data underlying
our explanatory variable are pre-conflict observations, addressing worries of reversed causation.
Our unit of observation is the dyad, as we regress the construction of peacewalls at the border
separating a ward pair on the violence flows between these two wards predicted by our structural
model.
In column (1) we control for the number of Catholics and Protestants in each ward of the
dyad, while in column (2) we go one step further and introduce 2 x 582 dummies to control
for ward fixed effects on each side of the boundary. In other words, we check whether walls
can be predicted by the expected violence interaction between two wards as our model suggests.
Strikingly, across-ward boundaries predict very well on which dyad boundary peacewalls were
built. The result in column (2) suggests, for example, that an increase of 10 deaths crossing a
ward boundary increases the likelihood of receiving a wall by more than 50 percentage points.
In other words, our model seems to indeed capture a reality which was also perceived by the
government at the time - the interaction between wards is key to understand the conflict.23
23One question that arises from this is whether the construction of peacewalls on ward boundaries had the desired
impact on the spatial weight parameter k1. In order to answer this question one needs to study changes of violence
across time in dyads which received a peacewall and compare them to dyads which did not receive a peacewall.
Unfortunately, while we benefit from detailed data on where walls were built, we only have coarse data on the
precise timing of construction, meaning that any analysis of the impact of peacewall construction may suffer from
attenuation bias (e.g. treating not-yet-constructed walls as already-constructed creates statistical noise biasing
estimated differences towards zero). Further, the expected violence-decreasing effect of peacewalls could also be
biased towards zero by endogeneity bias (i.e. if peacewalls are constructed in places that are expected to have the
largest future violence potential). With these caveats in mind, we have run regressions allowing for different k1
in dyads separated by peacewalls (results available upon request). We find that violence dropped more at ward
boundaries protected by a peacewall, but the difference is not statistically significant, which could either be due to
the statistical biases discussed above or due to peacewalls proving to be by and large ineffective (i.e. many of the
these barriers can be circumvented by well-equipped paramilitaries).
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(1) (2)
Dep. Var. Peaceline built on ward boundary
Expected attacks over ward boundary
(fitted values from structural model using
pre-conflict population) 0.02** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.02)
population controls yes no
ward fixed effects no yes
Observations 3,264 3,264
R-squared 0.27 0.68
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the dyad level (to adjust for double-counting). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression is run on the dyad level of direct neighbours. The left hand side variable
is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a peacewall was built on the dyad boundary. "Attacks over ward
boundary" is the predicted number of attacks that are taking place between the two wards in the dyad.
Population controls are the number of catholics and protestants in each of the wards. Ward fixed effects control
for two sets of fixed effects - one for each ward in the dyad (1164 in total).
Table 8: Predicting the location of peacewalls
6.3 Predicting the Impact of Changes in Population Localisation
Our model is also able to predict how violence evolves with changes in the composition of the
population. One obvious application of this is to use the actual change of composition from the
1971 census to the 1981 census to simulate changes in violence, assuming that parameters stayed
the same.
In Figure 9 below we make use of our model in the baseline Table 4 (which uses 1970s data),
but now apply it to the population composition and location of the 1980s. To visualize the effect
we calculate the predicted change in violence from the 1970s to the 1980s as depicted on the
x-axis of Figure 9. We then compare this to the actual change in violence between the 1970s and
1980s displayed on the y-axis. Most wards are located close to the 45 degree line, highlighting
the strong out-of-sample predictive power of the model. The figure also suggests that a big part
of the violence reduction in the 1980s could have been due to moving decisions of the population
away from the most dangerous areas.
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Figure 9: Out of sample predictions
causal, the population movement has saved over 600 lives.24 The main reason for this violence
reduction is that population sorted more, moving beyond the reach of perpetrators of violence -
especially in wards which were very violent in the 1970s.
7 Discussion: Relevance for Other Empirical Work
7.1 Relevance for Cross-country Studies
There is an increasing body of cross-country studies of civil wars that focus on nationwide in-
dicators of ethnic polarization or fractionalization (see Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and
Hoeffl er, 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Collier and Rohner, 2008; Collier, Hoeffl er,
and Rohner, 2009; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 2012). The emphasis of this literature is solely on
nationwide ethnic diversity, hence neglecting all information on local ethnic diversity. As shown
24The interpretation is obviously to be taken with caution as the spatial weight parameters of the model may
evolve over time.
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in our theory the latter is important: For similar nationwide ethnic polarization scores, a country
with two or three large ethnic groups that are geographically separated has lower local ethnic
tensions than places where ethnic groups inhabit the same geographical areas. According to our
theory, a given level of motivation at the aggregate level will lead to higher levels of violence with
potential attackers and targets being closer together.
One way to illustrate this is to focus on the number of attacks in our model. All violence






T g ≡ (N−g)′Wgdiag[(Ng)µ]WgN−g.
Taking the sum of Ag and A−g yields, after reformulation, the following expression, which
provides a measure of the aggregate attack potential in a country:





Note that our measure expresses the total predicted attacks A as a function of demographic
and distance parameters only. A is strictly increasing in T g, T−g, and R. When knowing the
sizes and settling patterns of the groups, one can compute predicted attacks A for all countries
around the world. An important characteristic of our measure is that it is not unit-free, i.e. it
explicitly takes into account different population size. This might help explain the huge variation
in violence intensity across conflicts. For example, two of the most intense conflicts, Rwanda and
Lebanon, are countries with diverse population groups living at close range. In contrast, India is
a country with an ongoing conflict and with a very large population, but with settlement patterns
that generate large distances and therefore prevent more intense violence.
A natural benchmark to compare these aggregate total attacks A to are the number of pre-
dicted attacks when distance is small. In particular, one can define a constellation where every-
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body is infinitely close, i.e. where for all bilateral links between people the proximity weight is







One can then define an index relating the actual availability of targets, T g, to the maximum
target availability T g where all bilateral links have maximum proximity weight k0. This index





It is easy to show that the actual predicted attacks relative to maximum predicted attacks,










= (IP )1/4 .
Note also that this novel IP index ranges between 0 and 1 and that one could in future work
compute it for all countries with available data and run a horse-race between it and established
measures such as "ethnic polarization", "ethnic fractionalization" or segregation indices on its
explanatory power of recorded violence.
7.2 Relevance for Within-country Studies
In recent years there has also been a boom of articles studying civil war with the help of geo-
referenced, disaggregated data, as discussed above in the literature review of Section 2. As
shown by our theory, running regressions that explain local violence with only the characteristics
of a given cell or district will be mis-specified when there is significant violence between these
units. And, using simply existing spatial econometrics tools will not solve this problem, as the
extent of such between-cell or between-district killings will depend on the interaction between
relative population characteristics of the cells or districts involved. To capture the full effect of
interactions across space the regression specifications need to rely on an underlying structural
theory of conflict between groups.
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The importance of interactions between characteristics across spatial units also seems of im-
portance for other work inside and outside the conflict literature. There is a large number of
economic decisions that are affected by the interaction of geographic features (plains next to
mountains, for example). In the move towards more and more disaggregated data these interac-
tions should receive close attention.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have built a novel framework explaining violence as interaction across space.
Neither the characteristics of a ward alone, nor the ward characteristics plus the characteristics of
the neighborhood suffi ce to provide a powerful predictor of violence. In fact, it is the interaction
between neighborhoods that is shown to be a prime driver of violence. As shown in the paper, our
setting outperforms the predictive power of both specifications regressing violence on cell-level
characteristics (i.e. assuming prohibitive transportation costs of violence) and specifications on
the country level (i.e. assuming that group location does not matter and that there is no distance
decay of violence).
Estimating the structural parameters of our model, we find a substantial decay of violence
when crossing ward borders. In particular, the transport cost of violence is 2-6 times larger
between wards than within wards. Our model is shown to generate a better fit and larger
explanatory power than main alternative competing frameworks, and offers several applications.
In particular, the framework allows for backing out the origin and destination of attacks, which
may be particularly useful for organizing counter-terrorism activities. Finally, the setting allows
for projections as well as counter-factual simulations of how group location patterns can drive
current and future conflict. Further, we are able to compute for every country a summary measure
of violence potential based on the group composition and location.
Several avenues seem promising for future research: First, it would be interesting to extend
the model allowing for beneficial effects of inter-group interaction (e.g. with trust-building à la
Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2013). Second, we aim to compute our aggregate measures of
the attack potential and interaction proximity as a function of demographics and geography for a
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variety of countries and to perform a cross-country analysis of the effect of nationwide and local
ethnic composition and location on conflict. Third, we warmly encourage studies that apply
the current framework to the analysis of other cases than Northern Ireland and to the study
of other phenomena than conflict where spatial heterogeneity of intensity and local interactions
play an important role. Migration, for example, is most attractive where rich areas are close
to poor areas. Other examples are research questions in regional science such as the study of
urbanization patterns and local economic activity, topics in electoral politics, such as the study
of local campaigning in national elections, or public health policies such as anti-AIDS campaigns.
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A Changes in Transport Costs
Our model allows us to analyse how much violence is driven by cross-border attacks. A way to
understand this is to set k1 = 0 in our model from equation (9) but keep everything else constant.
Figure 10 below shows what would happen in the 12 most violent wards.
As a point of departure we take our estimates from equation (9) to generate fitted values. In
the most violent ward we predict 100 casualties in the 1970s, in the second most violent ward 65
casualties, and so on (light grey bar). As a first step we then set k1 = 0, but only in the part of
the equation that describes the effectiveness of attacks across boundaries, i.e. we generate fitted
values according to

















j stay the same. This implies that the motivation to fight in all wards
is maintained but that there are no attacks across ward boundaries. There is a drastic decrease in
expected attacks in this thought experiment (dark grey bar). Attacks are reduced by more than
half. This illustrates the salience of cross-border attacks that our model predicts for the Northern
Irish conflict. A model which does not take the composition of the neighborhood into account
would miss this violence and instead attribute it to interactions within the same geographic unit.
As a next step we set k1 = 0 everywhere in equation (9).25 This also shuts down the re-




j ), leading to an
even sharper drop in casualties (black bar). The point of this exercise is to demonstrate that
motivation is an important factor. The reduction of violence from dark grey to black bars is
again very substantial.26
Taken together, Figure 10 highlights the incentives for policy makers to reduce movements of
people in situations with high-levels of acute violence. Depriving fighters of potential targets can

















26 In Appendix C we simulate the effect of composition on violence into and out of a ward of 2,000 inhabitants
in a neighborhood of 20,000 inhabitants. This exercise stresses the importance of motivation for violence levels.
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Figure 10: Counterfactual with k1 = 0
have large effects on violence in the short-run.27
B Further robustness checks and results
In this appendix we include two additional tables that are discussed in more detail above in the
main text. In particular, Table 9 below replicates Table 2, but using in each column the value of
µ that in a maximum likelihood grid search maximizes the overall fit of the model.
Further, Table 10 runs in column (1) an alternative specification for generating Figure 6 in
the main text, while column (2) performs another commonly used alternative specification.
27This result refers to the fighting intensity during conflict. In contrast, in post-conflict reconstruction, fostering
interaction and "building bridges" between communities may be important (see Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti,
2013).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES protestant casualties protestant casualties catholic casualties catholic casualties
mu 1.04 1.18 0.78 0.87
k0 10.49*** 8.17*** 11.97*** 10.78*
(0.82) (1.04) (2.80) (5.62)
k1 1.74*** 1.05*** 3.76*** 2.01
(0.11) (0.37) (0.59) (2.59)
k2 0.42 0.94
(0.29) (0.91)
Observations 582 582 582 582
R-squared 0.61 0.62 0.76 0.77
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the electoral district level (101
clusters). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Protestant casualties" are casualties of state forces and protestants.
"Catholic casualties" are casualties of catholics. "mu" is the parameter of the model that determines how the
recruitment of fighters relies on local population and is chosen in a grid search so as to maximize the R squared for
each specification. "k0-k2" are decay parameters. k0 captures the transport cost of conducting attacks within the
same ward. k1 captures the transport cost of conducting attacks in the direct (bordering) neighbourhood of the ward.
k2 captures the transport cost of crossing one ward to carry out an attack.
Table 9: Grid search of mu
(1) (2)
VARIABLES casualties casualties
protestants (in 1000) 2.03***
(0.41)
catholics (in 1000) 2.20***
(0.39)
protestants (in 1000) *
catholics (in 1000) 0.29***
(0.03)







Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Table 10: Alternative model with violence potential fully decaying in distance
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C Simulation of Violence in and out of Wards
Our model allows us to represent graphically in what type of environment a given ward is most
likely to "send" or "receive" violence. In what follows we simulate a ward (ward 1) of 2000
inhabitants in a neighborhood of 20000 inhabitants - this is roughly a ward of average size in a
neighborhood of average size. To simplify the analysis we assume that the neighborhood consists
of only one ward (ward 2). We will use our estimated model to distinguish between attacks into
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We first focus on the simulation of attacks on individuals in ward 1 from ward 2, depending
on the population composition in the two wards.28 Figure 11 depicts the number of attacks into
ward 1 on the z-axis, and the composition of the population in ward 1 and ward 2 on the other
two axis. The axis P1 captures the composition of ward 1. If P1 = 0, all 2, 000 inhabitants
in ward 1 are assumed to be Catholics. If P1 = 2, 000, all are Protestants. Analogously, if
P2 = 0, all 20, 000 inhabitants of the neighborhood (ward 2) are assumed to be Catholics, while
if P2 = 20, 000, all are assumed to be Protestants.







from observed fatalities and assume µ = 1. We then use the estimated
coeffi cients Mc = 0.63, ko = 8.30 and k1 = 3.45 from our main results of Table 4, column (1).
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Figure 11: Simulation of attacks against ward 1
are therefore no attacks on individuals in ward 1. Fix P1 = 0 and increase P2. The result is
an inverted U-shape in attacks on the ward 1. Why do attacks from outside take this shape?
The key to understanding the decrease in attacks despite the increasing number of Protestants
in ward 2 is the fact that attacks are driven both by the number of Protestants living close by
and by their motivation to engage in conflict. If P2 = 20, 000, there are no Catholics in ward 2
so that the Protestants in ward 2 are much less motivated to engage in violence (i.e. there are
fewer potential targets at close range). If, however, P2 = 10, 000, then there are a lot of targets
which leads to more fighters per Protestants in ward 2. If we fix P2 = 0 we get an increase in
violence with a rise in P1 because more targets are available in ward 1.
In contrast, Figure 12 focuses on the violence originating in ward 1. Again, fix P1 = 0
and increase P2. Now there is a convex relationship between violence and P2, driven by the
increased motivation due to more targets. The rising number of targets together with the rising
motivation leads to the convexity. Interestingly, the relationship is not convex if one fixes P2 = 0
and increases P1 instead, as there is now a trade-off that kicks in when Protestants become
the majority in ward 1. They are exceedingly "demotivated" by the lack of targets (Catholics)
within-ward.
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Figure 12: Simulation of attacks originating in ward 1
Figure 13: Simulation combining the outflow and inflow of attacks in ward 1
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In Figure 13 we combine the two previous figures. We can now grasp the determinants of a
ward becoming a net contributor to violence. In a nutshell, wards become net contributors to
violence if they are in a very homogenous surrounding with either only Protestants or Catholics.
The reason is that there are a lot more targets for inhabitants of ward 1 in this situation.
D Data on Peacewalls
First, we have collected data on the location of the peace lines. For this we drew on various lists
of peace lines containing geographical information (Jarman, 2005; BBC, 2009; Belfast Interface
Project, 2012), on the geo-referenced map of peace lines from NISRA (2006) and on correspon-
dence with the Department of Justice of Northern Ireland, which provided us with additional
information in response to our freedom of information request DOJ FOI 12/136.
Combining all this sources and using a geo-referenced map of all wards of Northern Ireland, we
have been able to put together a novel dataset on the location of peace lines. Peace lines running
parallel to borders between two wards and lying either directly on the ward border or in-between
the ward border and the nearest street are counted as peace lines separating two wards. Peace
lines located in only one ward and not meeting the above criterion are counted as within-ward
peace lines. We have not encountered problematic cases that could not be associated to neither
of the two categories above (i.e. there have not been peace lines running perpendicular to ward
borders and crossing them etc).
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